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Abstract 
We evaluate the impact of joint-liability incentives in the classroom using a randomized field 
experiment. The instructor design groups of three students in the classroom and provides a 
premium to their homework's grade only if all three members of the group accomplish some 
requirements. To isolate the joint liability effect from selfish motivations, we design also an 
individual incentives treatment. We find that joint-liability incentives impact positively on the 
grades accomplished in homework and midterm exams both in the experimental courses and 
in the other courses taken by the students in the semester. Though the positive average effect 
seems to disappear in the final exams, the overall impact of joint-liability incentives on the 
academic achievements in the semester is still positive. A drawback of this program is a 
decrease in the satisfaction with classmates. The significant effectiveness of the peer 
monitoring developed by the joint liability of group incentives provides novel implications for 
the design of the grading policies in the classroom and for other social settings where 
incentives may be based in peer monitoring or joint liability. 
Keywords: field experiment; randomization; education; joint liability; student incentives 
JEL: I20, I23  
                                                           
1
 jmcabrera@um.edu.uy 
2
 acid@um.edu.uy The corresponding author. Prudencio de Pena 2544, Montevideo 11600, Uruguay, Tel. & Fax: 
+598 27074461. 
 
We gratefully acknowledge the guidance of Martín Rossi. We also thank Ana Balsa, Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra, 
and Danilo Trupkin and seminar participants at Universidad de Montevideo for valuable comments. All errors 
remain our own. 
 
2 
 
I. Introduction  
Incentives for teachers have received considerable attention in previous literature. 
Less attention has been paid to encouraging students (Angrist, Oreopoulos, and Williams, 
2010; Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulous 2009; Fryer 2010; Grant and Green, 2012) and it is not 
conclusive. For instance, recent research suggests that grades designed as individual 
incentives, or even monetary rewards, are not always effective motivators for students. 
Grading schemes have evolved with the history of educational system, partly in response to 
demands for better information about undergraduate performance, but were not explicitly 
designed to motivate students (Grant and Green, 2012). 
We evaluate a novel design of incentives for students. That is, we design a joint 
liability contract that gives students strong incentives to monitoring each other. The 
instructor design groups of three students in the classroom and provides a premium to their 
homework's grade only if all three members of the group accomplish some requirements. To 
avoid self-virtuous group selection, we randomly assign participants to each group. And, in 
order to disentangle the pure effect of peer monitoring from the simple self motivation, we 
also randomly assign students to a group of individual incentives. Hence, employing 
randomization, we assign students to the joint-liability treatment, to the individual incentives 
treatment and to the control group. 
The experimental courses are core ones for freshmen students at Universidad de 
Montevideo, a private university in Uruguay -a developing country of Latin America. The 
course composition is primarily undergraduate students majoring in economics, management 
and accountancy.   
We find that joint-liability incentives impact positively on the grades accomplished in 
homework and midterm exams both in the experimental courses and in the other courses 
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taken by the students in the semester. Though the positive average effect seems to disappear 
in the final exams, the overall impact of joint-liability incentives on the academic 
achievements in the semester is still positive. On the other hand, the individual-incentive 
scheme has no effect. This result is in line with previous literature that provides not 
conclusive evidence about the effect of individual incentives on grades.  
The significant effectiveness of the peer monitoring developed by the joint liability of 
group incentives provide novel implications for the design of the grading policies in the 
classroom and for other social settings where incentives may be based in peer monitoring or 
joint liability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the program and 
explains the experiment design. Section III presents the econometric model and the results. 
Section IV concludes. 
II. Program and experiment design 
Program 
Undergraduate students at Universidad de Montevideo have to complete a number of 
credits in core courses in order to achieve their bachelor degree
3
. Two of these core courses 
are Macroeconomics I and Descriptive Economics, and students usually take them at their 
first year in the university. These two courses were structured in the same way in the 2011 
academic year: a midterm exam (35% of the final grade), eight take-home-tests (15%), and a 
final exam (50%)
4
. The minimum acceptable grade to approve the course is 6 in a rank from 1 
to 12. Also, attendance to classes is mandatory. Each course has sixty classes of fifty minutes 
each during fifteen weeks and students may have fifteen absences. There is nothing atypical 
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 Each course may have different credits. One credit corresponds to ten hours of classes.   
4
 The frequency of take-home-tests is nearly one per two weeks. Instructors determined this number of take-
home-tests looking for a sufficient number of occurrences that may form habit of exercising.    
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about these courses characteristics or their grading system in comparison with the other 
courses offered by the Universidad de Montevideo. We build a program that consists in giving 
incentives for take-home-tests and attendance.  
We want to test if incentives designed as a joint liability scheme improves academic 
outcomes. We face two major challenges to identify this causal effect. The first one is self 
virtuous group selection (no one wants to mix with lazy classmates to minimize the probability 
of losing the reward), that we overcome it with the random assignment of participants to 
groups. A second challenge is that if faced with an incentive, an individual may exert more 
effort, whether he is in a group or not. If we only have the joint liability treatment and a 
control group we cannot uncover selfish motivations to get the prize from pure peer 
monitoring. So we build two different treatments in the classroom: individual and joint 
liability incentives, and a control group. With this design we think that we can identify the 
pure monitoring effect of peers. 
Thus, we randomly distributed students in three groups
5
.   
In the Joint Liability group (Treated group 1), the student is randomly assigned to a group 
of three students and receives a 20% increase in the grade of each take-home-test if each 
student of her group fulfills two conditions: she obtains a grade of at least 6 in the take-home-
test, and has no absences during the week in which the take-home-test must be handed in.  
In the Individual Incentive group (Treated group 2), the student receives a 20% increase in 
the grade of each take-home-test if she obtains a grade of at least 6 in the take-home-test, 
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 The grading of these take-home-tests is done by research assistants that do not know the distribution of the 
students among the different treatments. 
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and has no absences that week. These are the same requirements as Treatment 1, but they 
don´t depend on the compliance of others.  
In the Control group, the student does not receive any incentive besides the general 
conditions of grading in the course. 
Take-home-tests in this field experiment do not require team work, even for students in 
treatment group 1. Each student is required to hand in his personal sheet with solutions at 
the beginning of the class and there’s no problem if her solutions are identical to the ones of 
any other classmate.  
For the evaluation design we use randomized trials, with the approval of the ethical 
review board of the university. There are 51 different students in this field experiment, 26 of 
them in Macroeconomics I and 25 in Descriptive Economics course. The selection process was 
as follows. In August 2011, all 51 applicants were subject to a survey. In this baseline survey 
we collected data on a wide array of students’ characteristics such as age, gender, working 
hours, hours devoted to sports and volunteering, high school of origin and region of the 
country were they come from, distance between their home in Montevideo and the 
university, academic expectations and number of friends in the course. We have also 
administrative baseline data provided by the university such as grade average in previous 
courses and number of credits already completed at the university. From this population, 
given the restriction that the number of students in the joint liability group must be multiple 
of three, 24 students were randomly assigned to treated group 1, 14 to the treated group 2 
and the remaining 13 candidates were assigned to the control group. 
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Timeline of the Program and Data Collection 
 
 
 
Once the random allocation was performed, the balancing condition was checked. In case 
of significant differences at the ten percent level in mean pre-treatment characteristics 
between control and treated groups the random assignment procedure was repeated until 
we obtained an allocation that fulfills the balancing condition. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 reports the balancing condition and shows that the three groups have similar 
characteristics. They are balanced in eighteen observables variables. By the random allocation 
design, the probability of receiving a treatment is orthogonal to students characteristics, so 
including these characteristics in the regression model, while it may reduce standard errors, is 
not necessary for consistency
6
. 
As is normal in studies that follow students during period of classes, some observations 
suffered attrition. At November 2011 two individuals from Treatment Group 1, one from 
Treatment Group 2, and three of the Control Group dropped from the program. We have 
some outcomes for them during the courses and follow up administrative data, but we were 
not able to collect the complete data (grade at midterm exam, satisfaction with classmates or 
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evaluation of the instructor) in these six cases due to different reasons (most students are 
freshmen and usually a rate of them change to other degrees, some of them leave the course 
before the midterm exam and some refuse to evaluate the instructor because the evaluation 
demands extra time out of class).  
We compare the pre-treatment characteristics between the individuals that have suffered 
attrition and those students who remain in the treated/control groups. Since fifteen from 
eighteen variables remain balanced, baseline data provide a measure of the similarity of these 
two groups. Only three variables are not balanced, that is, students that don’t belong to 
Montevideo, students with fewer friends, and students with more unknown people in the 
class tend to drop more
7
. 
III. Econometric model and results 
The primary purpose of this study is to determine the causal effect of Treatment 1 (joint-
liability incentives to undergraduate students) and Treatment 2 (individual incentives) on 
students’ achievements. Formally we want to estimate the following equation: 
Yi = a + bT1i + cT2i + dGroupi + Xi’f + ei          (1) 
where Yi is one of the outcomes of interest for student i (number of take-home-tests handed 
in, average grade at take-home-tests, grade of the midterm exam, grade at final exam, grade 
average in the midterm exams and homework of other simultaneous courses, average grade in 
the final exams of other simultaneous courses, accumulated grade average in the students 
career, total number of credits achieved in the semester), T1i is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if student i is assigned to the treated group 1 and zero otherwise, T2i is a 
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request. 
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dummy variable that takes the value of one if student i is assigned to the treated group 2 and 
zero otherwise, b and c are the parameters of interest, Groupi is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the student i belongs to the Macroeconomic course and zero otherwise, Xi 
is a matrix of students’ characteristics, and ei is the error term. Given that there’s no problem 
of no-compliers, we can estimate this equation consistently with Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS).   
Prior research suggests that graded homework causes students to spend more effort 
relative to assigning non-graded homework (Pozo and Skull, 2006). Does providing joint-
liability and individual extra incentives for take-home-tests raises the overall student’s 
academic performance? We are in a context of multiple outcomes. So in order to draw 
general conclusions, in Table 2 we present findings of a summary index that aggregate 
information over the eight educational outcomes (number of take-home-tests handed in, 
average grade at take-home-tests, grade of the midterm exam, grade at final exam, grade 
average in the midterm exams and homework of other simultaneous courses, average grade 
in the final exams of other simultaneous courses, accumulated grade average in the students 
career, total number of credits achieved in the semester). To construct this summary index we 
follow the procedure used in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) and Dal Bó and Rossi (2011). This 
overall index is defined to be the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components, 
with the sign of each measure oriented so that more beneficial outcomes have higher scores
8
. 
The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control 
group standard deviation.  
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 Summary Index = (percentage of take home tests + average grade at take home tests + grade at midterm exam 
+ grade at final exam + average grade at take home tests & midterm exams of other simultaneous courses + 
average grade at the final exams of other simultaneous courses + accumulated average grade during the 
student’s career + credits achieved in the semester)/8, all components built as z-scores.  
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[Insert Table 2] 
Table 2 shows that the effect of Treatment 1 (Joint-liability Incentives), on the overall 
index that averages together all eight outcomes, is statistically significant and the size of this 
overall effect is around 0.45 standard deviations, in comparison with the control group
9
 
10
. 
These results are similar when we control for the variables that are unbalanced due to 
attrition (Interior as region of origin, number of friends in the class, number of totally unknown 
people in the class)
11
. Given that grades at take-home-tests in the experimental courses may 
be too noisy (students may cheat due to the pressure exerted by the peer monitoring), we 
also build the index without the variable average grade at take-home-tests and the results are 
similar
12
.  This positive average effect of the joint-liability mechanism is also present in other 
research areas like microfinance (Becchetti and Pisani, 2010; Banerjee and Duflo, 2010) where 
theory argues that this instrument gives poor borrowers strong incentives to monitoring each 
other and, thus, reduces moral hazard.  One of the most important keys of success is 
considered to be the joint liability mechanism, that is, the bank provides small individual loans 
to a group of borrowers and enforces a contract in which an individual’s default on repayment 
implies penalties for the other group-mates.  
On the other hand, as Table 2 reports, Treatment 2 (Individual Incentives) has no 
significant effect on the students’ performance in the course. This result is in line with 
previous literature that suggest that though grades may be theoretically valuable as an ability 
signal in the job market (Zubrickas, 2012), they are not effective motivators in college classes 
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 Table 2 considers 43 individuals due to, besides the six individuals who suffer attrition, two students did not 
take the final exam (they did not reach the minimum required grade of 4 at homework&midterm). 
10
 The absolute magnitudes of the indices are in units akin to standardized test scores: the estimates shows 
where the mean of the treatment group is in the distribution of the control group in terms of standard deviation 
units.  
11
 Results available from the authors upon request. 
12
 Results available from the authors upon request. 
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at universities (Grant and Green, 2012), at least when they are designed as individual 
incentives.  
The fact that Treatment 1 (Joint-liability Incentives) increases the index of overall 
performance may be the result of different patterns of effects over the individual outcomes 
that are included in the index. Thus, we investigate in Table 3 the effect of the treatments on 
each of the eight educational outcomes that are linked with the student’s academic 
performance
13
. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The first column of Table 3 reports the effects on the percentage of take-home-tests 
handed in by the students. Treatment 1 (Joint-liability Incentives) seems to impact positively 
on the homework done by the students, increasing the percentage of take-home-tests 
handed in by 18 percent, an increase of 30 percent relative to the control group. Treatment 2 
(Individual Incentives) does not show any significant impact. In the second column, we 
observe the effect of the treatments on the average grade of the take-home-tests
14
. We 
standardize the results of the average grade at take-home-tests for each of the courses 
(Macroeconomics and Descriptive Economics)
 15
. While Treatment 1 (Joint-liability Incentives) 
increases the standardized average grade at take-home-tests by .75, Treatment 2 (Individual 
Incentives) seems to have no effect. The third column shows us the impact of the treatments 
on the midterm examinations. We also standardize the results of the grades in midterm 
exams for each of the courses (Macroeconomics and Descriptive Economics). Those who 
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 The results are similar when we include no controls and when we control for the variables that are unbalanced 
due to attrition (Interior as region of origin, number of friends in the class, number of totally unknown people in 
the class). Results are available from the authors upon request. 
14
 We do not include the prize of 20 percent in this average grade. 
15
 The standardized grades are calculated by subtracting the course (Macroeconomics I or Descriptive Economics) 
mean and dividing by the course standard deviation. Average grades at take-home-test do not include the 20% 
premium. 
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received Treatment 1 (Joint-liability Incentives) outperform the control group by .7 in the 
standardized grades of midterm examinations. Once again, Treatment 2 (Individual 
Incentives) does not show any significant impact. In column four, we see that the estimates 
do not report any significant impact on the grade at final examination. At first sight, these 
findings could show that the positive impact of the group incentives is present only in the 
short run (higher percentage of take-home-test handed in with higher grades on average and 
higher grades at midterm exams) and fades out in the long run (there`s no improvement in 
the grade at the final exam among the students who receive the treatments). Moreover, one 
may state that this program of extra incentives may distort the quantity of time that students 
assign to the different courses of the semester. In other words, these incentives may divert 
the students efforts from other courses, condemning them to poorer results in the grades 
accomplished at other courses.  In order to study this argument, we should find out the 
spillover effects of this program of extra incentives. 
The fifth column of Table 3 reports the effects of the treatments on the average grade 
accomplished at midterm exams and homework of other simultaneous courses taken by the 
students in the same semester. Treatment 2 (Individual Incentives) does not show any 
significant impact, but Treatment 1 (Joint-liability Incentives) increases the average grade of 
midterm exams and homework of simultaneous courses by 1.16, an increase of nearly 20 
percent relative to the control group. 
Though in column sixth we observe that there`s no improvement in the average grade at 
the final exams in the other simultaneous courses among the students who receive the 
treatments, the seventh and eighth columns show positive spillover effects. The joint-liability 
incentives increase the accumulated grade average accomplished by the students in their 
12 
 
undergraduate life by nearly 12 percent in comparison to the control group. And Treatment 1 
also increases the credits completed in the semester by 9, an increase of nearly 40 percent 
relative to the control group. Hence, Treatment 1 (Joint-liability incentives) increases the 
overall student’s academic performance in the semester. 
In sum, joint-liability incentives increase academic performance during the period of 
classes both in the experimental courses and in the other simultaneous courses of the 
semester. This positive effect dilutes during the period of exams though eventually the overall 
impact of group incentives on academic performance is positive. There are several 
explanations for this and we discussed them -after the follow up of the experiment- with a 
focus group formed by students who had participated in the experiment. This discussion was 
an enriching experience to evaluate different hypotheses. For instance, in terms of the model 
of Becker and Murphy (1988) - employed also by Charness and Gneezy (2009) in a field 
experiment about the formation of fitness habits - peer monitoring may increase human 
capital accumulation and develop habit formation
16
. This greater stock of human capital may 
have positive effects on the academic performance of all the courses in the semester but 
joint-liability incentives may not achieve to develop a strong habit of studying. Thus, the rate 
of disappearance of the human capital, the rate of preference for the present and the 
absence of strong habits of studying may explain the null effects of the treatment in the 
period of final exams –when the joint-liability incentives are absent
17
.  
An additional possible reason behind our results is a kind of peer effect. The relative 
better performance of students in midterm exams under peer-monitoring is a signal to the 
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 The motivation for the hypothesis “students will study more frequently after the incentives are removed as 
compared to before the incentives were introduced” is “habit formation”. 
17
 “Habits increase the marginal utility of engaging in an activity in the future. People seem to systematically 
underestimate the impact of their current actions on the utility of future action and to discount the future too 
much. As a result, people may underinvest in habit-forming activities” (Charness and Gneezy, 2009).     
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control group that they should study more for final exams and that they should obtain the 
class-notes of the treated students and study with them. Thus the control group may be 
catching up.  
Given previous findings that show a positive effect of attendance on academic 
performance (i.e. Dobkin, Gil and Marion, 2010), one could argue that the positive effects of 
the joint liability scheme during the period of classes may be based on the possible higher 
rate of attendance of students under the pressure of peer monitoring. But, in this field 
experiment, attendance does not seem to be the cause of better performance since the 
students assigned to the joint liability treatment did not show a higher attendance rate
18
.  
Another potential explanation for our findings of no effects at the final exam may be that 
students just wish to accomplish a satisfactory performance in their overall academic 
semester, that is, in the four or five courses that they usually take per semester
19
. The 
instructor wishes to elicit high effort by them in his course.  Under the pressure of a scheme 
of peer monitoring and joint liability, the students take on the startup cost –that may loom 
large at first sight- of coordinating to prepare take-home-tests with other classmates after 
school hours and sit down to study with them. Peer-monitoring moves some people past the 
“threshold” needed to really engage in learning, at least for some time. Once they have taken 
on this sunk cost, students devote time with their classmates not only to study for the 
experimental course but also to the other simultaneous courses of the semester due to they 
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 Results available from the authors upon request. 
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 Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) suppose a certain principal-agent relationship where the principal (the 
instructor) offer a contract to the agents (students) to elicit high effort by them. The contract is designed as a 
scheme of peer monitoring. The agent accepts this contract but then unwinds part of these incentives through 
additional trades. Tommasi and Weinschelbaum refer to these outside trading opportunities as “insurance”. The 
main function of these potential trades is to take risk away from the agents, hence playing an insurance role.  In 
terms of our experiment, the students assigned to the treatment 1 (joint-liability incentives), are obliged, by 
means of peer monitoring, to increase their attention devoted to the course. But the students take not only the 
experimental course but also four or five courses per semester and they want to get a satisfactory overall 
performance; they are not interested in devoting a great attention to only one course. 
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seek satisfactory performance in their overall academic semester. Thus, treated students 
accomplished better academic performance at homework and midterm examinations during 
the period of classes. The positive academic experiences achieved during the period of classes 
may be a source of creating a sense of self-efficacy because they provide students authentic 
evidence that they have capability to succeed at the task (Dochy, Segers and van Dinther 
2011), so at the time of the final exams, when the peer monitoring disappears, the students 
unwind the incentive to achieve better grades at final exams and rest on the higher grades 
achieved at homework and at midterms during the courses of the semester, adjusting 
downward the time devoted to study for the final exams. This downward adjustment is 
limited by the fact that each course at the university demands a minimum grade of six (in a 
one-twelve scale) in the final examination to approve the course. Hence, the overall academic 
performance at the semester increases since each course in the university is graded taking 
into account the grade at homework & midterm exam (50 percent) –that increases by peer 
monitoring- and the grade at the final exam (50 percent) –that is not affected by the 
treatment. In sum, the joint-liability incentive does not harm the performance in 
simultaneous courses, and really is effective to increase overall academic performance.  
Exploiting the data available at the follow up survey, we are interested in measure if this 
Treatment 1 (Joint-liability Incentives) that achieved positive effects on students’ global 
academic performance in the semester has spillover effects on students’ subjective well-
being.     
[Insert Table 4] 
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As Table 4 shows, the group incentives impacts negatively on the satisfaction with 
classmates reported by the students
20
. This finding may capture that the students that receive 
the group incentives were assigned to groups of three students by randomization. That is, to 
win the prize of an extra grade of 20 percent demands that each one in the group of three 
fulfills the requirements (attendance to class, take-home-tests handed in, a minimum grade at 
the take-home-tests). If one of the three classmates of the group does not honor the 
requisites, all of them are condemned to lose the prize, no matter the individual effort done. 
In other words, many of these students are freshmen from different high schools of origin, 
they are not necessarily close friends and they are required to interact within a group. They 
may develop some reproaches to the other members of the group, for instance, each time 
one of them did not hand in the homework he makes the other members of the group lose 
their prize; or if one student of the group of three behaves as a free rider cheating the 
homework. But in these occasions, they may not have enough confidence to express their 
anger or frustration openly. Also the free riders may be resented because they are thought to 
be taking more than their fair premium or failing to shoulder any part of the cost of it. Thus, 
these hidden reproaches and resentments may manifest at the follow up survey.   We think 
this is a novel result, and is not mentioned for example in Banerjee and Duflo (2010) as a cost 
of group liability schemes (one of such costs is imposing excessive risk-aversion on members, 
as in Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994). 
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 The results are similar when we control for the variables that are unbalanced due to attrition (Interior as 
region of origin, number of friends in the class, number of totally unknown people in the class). Results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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As Table 5 reports, the students that received Treatment 1 does not seem to extend these 
reproaches to the evaluation of the instructor done by the students
21
.    
[Insert Table 5] 
However, Treatment 2 (individual incentives) impacts negatively on the evaluation of the 
instructor of the course.  Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel (2011) provide a possible explanation 
stating that offering incentives for improved academic performance may signal that achieving 
a specific goal is difficult, that the task is not attractive, or that the agent is not well-suited for 
it, or that the principal does not trust the agent’s intrinsic motivation. Also, the individual 
incentives design makes clear for the rest of the classmates if the student achieves the 
requirement. This increase in the signal may result in a lower personal image, and thus, 
contrary to what one could expect at the beginning of the experiment, the student may be 
unhappy with the instructor for the assignment to the treatment of individual incentives.  
A usual concern in evaluations of programs by randomization is that results of the control 
group may be negatively affected by the effect of bad luck in the lottery on motivation. 
However, table 5 reports that the students who were assigned randomly to the control group 
do not show any significant difference in the evaluation of their instructor relative to the 
other groups.  
Finally, we run a placebo test. We postulate that there is no plausible channel through 
which the program could affect the students’ satisfaction with the neighborhood at which the 
university is located. Thus, we should see negligible effects on the outcome satisfaction with 
the neighborhood of the university. 
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data. Instead we have obtained aggregated data of the evaluation of each professor (Macroeconomics and 
Descriptive Economics) by treatment 1, treatment 2 and control group.  
17 
 
  [Insert Table 6] 
As we expected, we find no significant impact of group incentives treatment on the 
students’ satisfaction with the neighborhood of the university
22
. Thus, we may infer that the 
previous findings (joint-liability incentives increase homework done and its average grade, 
grades at midterm exams, average grades in other courses, average grade in the student 
career and credits accomplished in the semester) are operating through the jointly liability 
mechanism and are not spurious correlations. This, together with the random assignment to 
treatment, leads us to believe in the causal interpretation of our previous findings. 
IV. Conclusions and Discussion 
Several conclusions emerge from this randomized field experiment. First, joint-liability 
incentives increase academic performance in the course by peer monitoring. Second, joint-
liability incentives have positive spillover effects on the other simultaneous courses taken on 
by the treated students in the semester. Our results suggest that group incentives improve 
the overall index of academic performance in the semester. Both the direct effects and the 
spillover effects show a large percentage increase in comparison to the control group. The 
main drawback of these positive effects of the joint-liability incentives is the decrease in the 
rate of satisfaction reported by the treated students towards their classmates.  Third, the 
program appears to be very cost-effective: we manage to design a successful mechanism to 
improve student´s academic achievements without giving monetary rewards. Fourth, 
individual incentives show no effect on academic performance, but seem to impact 
unfavorably on the evaluation of the instructor made by students. Fifth, while students under 
the joint-liability incentives outperformed the other students on homework and midterm 
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 The results are similar when we control for the variables that are unbalanced due to attrition (Interior as 
region of origin, number of friends in the class, number of totally unknown people in the class). Results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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exams, there was no statistically significant improvement on the final exam. There are several 
possible explanations for this. The positive impact of joint-liability incentives diminish with 
time, or the control group may be caching up through peer or signaling effects, or the 
students may seek only a satisfactory performance in all the courses and not an special grade 
just in the experimental courses. Further research could help distinguish among these 
possibilities.     
Another open question in a joint-liability scheme is the effect of class size and the 
effect of group size in the efficiency of peer monitoring. In this field experiment, class size is 
small and it makes easier to monitor the behavior of a classmate inducing her to do the 
homework properly, but in a larger class the cost of peer monitoring may be too high to be 
accomplished. For instance, we could imagine a class size of two hundred where it is very 
difficult just to know the name of each other. In addition, given all other conditions equal, a 
larger size of each joint-liability group certainly increases the cost of peer monitoring. In this 
field experiment, each joint-liability group is formed by only three students. But, what would 
happen if each joint-liability group is formed by nine students? A committed student could be 
discouraged by the greater probability that someone of the group may not fulfill the 
requirements to obtain the prize.  
In the light of furthering our understanding, it is also important to study the long run 
impacts of the joint-liability incentives and the heterogeneity of effects among different 
students.  What will happen if the additional incentive is reduced permanently? Will the effort 
be lower than it was before extrinsic incentives were offered? Negative long-run effects on 
students’ joy of learning might be especially troublesome (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel, 
2011). An interesting analogy is that in terms of incentives to sport exercising among 
undergraduate students, a strong decline –particularly on those who have already attend the 
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gym regularly- in exercising after removing the incentives is not completely rejected 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2009).   
Finally, given the questionably efficacy of individual extrinsic incentives, educators 
may seek ways to make the learning experience more interesting, that is, if students develop 
intrinsic motivation for improve their knowledge and skills, they may become fully engaged 
with learning and devote more effort to this experience. Effort is shown to be important in 
improving the knowledge gained by students, and, by rewarding effort especially for certain 
students, it may motivate them to be better students (Swinton, 2010).  This hypothesis 
requires more research. 
The external validity of our conclusions is limited in principle to students similar to 
those that participate in this field experiment. Despite this selectivity, we should bear in mind 
that there is nothing atypical about these course characteristics, that are similar to firs year 
introductory courses in most universities. Certainly, it is unclear whether the conclusions of 
this research generalize to younger students. Hopefully subsequent investigations will clarify 
this.  Designing systems to better accomplish the task of effectively motivating students 
represents a formidable challenge for researchers, policymakers, and educators.  Our research 
fosters the literature on students incentives by suggesting that joint liability schemes should 
also be considered when designing such a system. 
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Table 1 - Pre-treatment characteristics by treatment assignment  
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Control Diff (Treat2-Treat1) Diff (Control-Treat1) Diff (Control-Treat2) 
Age (in months) 238.904 233.757 237.605 -5.147 
(5.165) 
-1.298 
(5.614) 
3.848 
(4.576) 
Male .666 .785 .846 .119 
(.155) 
.179 
(.154) 
.060 
(.155) 
Average grade 7.970 7.328 7.453 -.642 
(.546) 
-.516 
(.521) 
.125 
(.528) 
Credits accomplished 53.333 35.642 48.423 -17.690 
(15.549) 
-4.910 
(18.157) 
12.780 
(15.015) 
Bachelor in Economics .541 .500 .538 -.041 
(.172) 
-.003 
(.176) 
.038 
(.199) 
Work .166 .214 .076 .047 
(.133) 
-.089 
(.120) 
-.137 
(.139) 
Volunteering .250 .214 .153 -.035 
(.146) 
-.096 
(.144) 
-.060 
(.155) 
Interior .250 .357 .307 .107 
(.155) 
.057 
(.156) 
-.049 
(.188) 
High School 1  .291 .285 .230 -.005 
(.156) 
-.060 
(.156) 
-.054 
(.175) 
High School 2  .166 .071 .076 -.095 
(.115) 
-.089 
(.120) 
.005 
(.104) 
Hours of sports per week 3.812 5.178 4.423 1.366 
(1.095) 
.610 
(1.051) 
-.755 
(1.185) 
Satisfaction with classmates 4.166 4.214 4.307 .047 
(.272) 
.141 
(.260) 
.093 
(.318) 
Travel time to the university (in minutes) 27.708 27.142 22.692 -.565 
(4.667) 
-5.016 
(4.649) 
-4.450 
(3.786) 
Group (1 = Macroeconomics; 
 2 = Descriptive Economics) 
1.500 1.500 1.461 .000 
(.172) 
-.038 
(.176) 
-.038 
(.199) 
Study in group (in % of the time) .280 .350 .411 .069 
(.078) 
.131 
(.085) 
.061 
(.094) 
Friends (%) .133 .184 .119 .051 
(.036) 
-.013 
(.036) 
-.064 
(.042) 
Still unknown (%) .557 .500 .588 -.056 
(.077) 
.030 
(.084) 
.087 
(.095) 
Educational aspirations 3.875 4.000 3.461 .125 
(.320) 
-.413 
(.318) 
-.538 
(.386) 
Observations 24 14 13    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2 – The effect of incentives on academic achievement 
 Dependent variable: index of academic achievement 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment 1 Joint-liability 0.460 
**
 
(0.202) 
0.437 
*
 
(0.218) 
0.389
+
  
(0.234) 
    
Treatment 2 Individualistic 0.189 
(0.225) 
0.165 
(0.241) 
0.205 
(0.295) 
Controls:    
Gender No Yes Yes 
Age No Yes Yes 
Working No No Yes 
Time devoted to sports No No Yes 
Educational expectations No No Yes 
Observations 43 43 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
All models control by group where dummy=1 if student attends Macroeconomics group, and dummy=0 if attends 
Descriptive Economics group.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
+
p value=0.106 
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Table 3 - The effect of incentives on academic achievement by outcome 
 Effects on the course performance Spillover effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Percentage of 
Take-home-tests 
handed in 
Average grade of 
take-home 
(standardized) 
Grade at 
midterm exam 
(standardized) 
Grade at final 
exam 
(standardized) 
Average grade in 
homework & 
midterm exams in 
other 
simultaneous 
courses 
Average grade 
at other 
simultaneous 
final exams 
Total average 
grade 
accumulated in 
the student 
career 
Credits 
accomplished 
in the 
semester 
Mean of Control Group 0.653 -0.524 -0.477 -0.006 6.252 7.056 6.646 23.346 
Treatment 1 Joint-liability  0.186
**
 
(0.0761) 
  0.635
**
 
(0.263) 
0.685
*
 
(0.371) 
-0.0249 
(0.460) 
1.153
*
 
(0.678) 
0.265 
(0.602) 
0.798
*
 
(0.465) 
9.229
*
 
(5.353) 
         
Treatment 2 Individualistic 0.0994 
(0.0895) 
0.318 
(0.310) 
0.380 
(0.470) 
-0.102 
(0.495) 
0.235 
(0.919) 
0.162 
(0.713) 
-0.146 
(0.519) 
5.359 
(6.521) 
Controls: All models include gender, age, working status, time devoted to sports, educational expectations, group (dummy variable taking the value of 1 in Macroeconomics course).  
Observations 51 51 46 43 48 46 51 51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 4 – The effects of incentives on satisfaction with classmates 
 Dependent variable: Index of satisfaction with classmates  
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Mean of Control Group 4.300 4.300 4.300 
Treatment 1 Joint-liability -0.474 
(0.293) 
-0.513
*
 
(0.258) 
-0.502
*
 
(0.278) 
    
Treatment 2 Individualistic -0.0488 
(0.344) 
-0.0975 
(0.304) 
-0.0998 
(0.342) 
Controls:    
Gender No Yes Yes 
Age No Yes Yes 
Working No No Yes 
Time devoted to sports No No Yes 
Educational Expectations No No Yes 
Observations 45 45 45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
All models control by group where dummy=1 if student attends Macroeconomics group, and dummy=0 if attends 
Descriptive Economics group.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 5 – The effects of incentives on the evaluation of the instructor made by students 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis 
  
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Control Diff 
(Treat2 – Treat1) 
Diff 
(Control – Treat 1) 
Diff 
(Control –Treat 2) 
 Mean 0.239 -0.534 0.139   -0.773** 
(0.347) 
-0.100 
  (0.339) 
0.673 
(0.439) 
       
Observations 21 12 10    
27 
 
Table 6 – False experiment – Satisfaction with the neighborhood of the university 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment 1 Joint-liability -0.367 
(0.366) 
-0.317 
(0.366) 
-0.408 
(0.375) 
    
Treatment 2 Individualistic 0.209 
(0.380) 
0.186 
(0.400) 
0.0930 
(0.380) 
Controls:    
Gender No Yes Yes 
Age No Yes Yes 
Working No No Yes 
Time devoted to sports No No Yes 
Educational expectations No No Yes 
Observations 45 45 45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
All models control by group where dummy=1 if student attends Macroeconomics group, and dummy=0 if attends 
Descriptive Economics group.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
